Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy (...) might serve feminist objectives, and prove consistent with sexual equality. By arguing that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion rights was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point. Maintaining that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, related to the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and so can have no place in a democracy.1 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for abortions.2 Moreover, the Court’s subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared to confirm the truth of MacKinnon’s observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon’s condemnation of Harris. -/- This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers. When we contrast the Majority and Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not. This is not simply because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike the latter, rely on empirical and normative assumptions that would justify sexual inequality whatever right they were used to interpret. So while I agree with MacKinnon that the Majority’s interpretation of the right to privacy in Harris is inconsistent with the equality of men and women, I show that there is no inherent inconsistency in valuing both privacy and equality, and no reason why we must chose to protect the one, rather than the other. Indeed, an examination of MacKinnon’s article, I suggest, can help us to see why rights to privacy can be part of a scheme of democratic rights, and how we might go about democratising the right to privacy in future. To avoid confusion I should emphasise that my arguments are of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. Thus, I will be ignoring the specifically legal and constitutional aspects of MacKinnon’s article, and of the Supreme Court decisions, in order to bring their philosophical significance into focus. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore a pragmatic approach to hope and the ethics of belief that allows rational hope against hope. Hope against hope is hope that goes beyond what the evidence supports by hoping for something that is both highly unlikely and highly valuable. However, this could take different forms. One could either hope against the evidence or merely go beyond it; the evidence could be inconclusive or conclusive, conflicting or clear, misleading or plain, absent or (...) neutral. Hope against hope then covers everything from hoping for something that appears unlikely to hoping for something that appears impossible, judging by the available evidence. However, there is a very long tradition of criticizing hope for being false or irrational. But hope can only be false or irrational if it is subject to rational assessment. This presupposes that it is appropriate to ask for a reason or a justification for hoping, since one can be answerable or responsible for hoping. Moreover, this typically assumes that hopes can be changed in response to reasons. False hopes, notably, should be given up (if possible). However, if hope is subject to rational assessment, it is also possible for hope to be rational or justified. Indeed, I will explore how practical reasons or pragmatic considerations may justify hope against hope, sketching criteria for rational hope that allow hope against hope. Section I introduces evidentialism and pragmatism regarding belief. Sections II and III discuss whether or not rational hope against hope is compatible with evidentialism, favoring a pragmatist approach to hope and belief. Section IV discusses evidentialism and pragmatism, whereas sections V-VII sketch constraints on pragmatism and rational hope. (shrink)

The relationship between attention and consciousness is one that is crucial for understanding perception and different types of conscious experience, and we commend this analysis of the topic by Pitts, Lutsyshyna, and Hillyard (2018). We have also examined this relationship closely (e.g., Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015) and would like to point out a few potential contradictions in the Pitts et al. paper that require clarification, particularly in the attempt to reconcile aspects of recurrent processing theory (RPT) with global neuronal workspace (...) theory (GNWT). This commentary addresses these points and introduces other considerations important for this topic. (shrink)

Critical analysis of Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision.

On 24 July 2022, the landmark decision Roe v. Wade (1973), that secured a right to abortion for decades, was overruled by the US Supreme Court. The Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organisation severely restricts access to legal abortion care in the USA, since it will give the states the power to ban abortion. It has been claimed that overruling Roe will have disproportionate impacts on women of color and that restricting access to abortion contributes to or (...) amounts to structural racism. In this paper, we consider whether restricting abortion access as a consequence of overruling Roe could be understood as discrimination against women of color (and women in general). We argue that banning abortion is indirectly discriminatory against women of color and directly (but neither indirectly, nor structurally) discriminatory against women in general. (shrink)

In this open peer commentary, we concur with the three target articles’ analysis and positions on abortion in the special issue on Roe v. Wade as the exercise of reproductive liberty essential for the bioethical commitment to patient autonomy and self-determination. Our proposed OPC augments that analysis by explicating more fully the concept crucial to Roe of fetal personhood. We explain that the development and use of predictive reproductive technologies over the fifty years since Roe has changed the literal image, (...) and thereby the epistemological landscape, through which a prospective parent comes to know the fetus. The logic of Roe required a legal and ethical denial of fetal personhood to prioritize maternal autonomy over claims to fetal moral personhood. Our claim is that such a denial may be more complicated today. The fetal person genetic testing and reproductive imaging now presents to prospective parents has become an increasingly individualized, distinct medicalized picture of a developing person with which a parent can either identify or differentiate. In contrast, the fetal person of Roe was an abstract and vague figure stripped of most human particulars, a pregnancy rather than the specific individualized human entity reproductive technology now presents as a person to prospective parents. We discuss the implications of this shift and call for a more capacious analysis of reproductive ethics that works towards both reproductive and disability justice. (shrink)

RIGHT TO SILENCE-UK, U.S, FRANCE, and GERMANY SALLY RAMAGE (TRADE MARK REGISTERED) WIPO Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Pages 2-30 Current Criminal Law, Volume 1, Issue 2, -/- Sally Ramage, BA (Hons), MBA, LLM, MPhil, MCIJ, MCMI, DA., ASLS, BAWP. Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Publisher & Managing Editor Criminal Lawyer series [1980-2022](ISSN 2049-8047) Current Criminal Law series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8405) and Criminal Law News series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8421). Sweet & Maxwell (Thomson Reuters) (Licensed Annotator of UK Statutes) in annual law books Current Law (...) Statutes Annotated, (2006, 2009, 2010 editions) (sole and separate S&M contracts) for 7 UK Criminal Justice Statutes: UK Safeguarding Vulnerable Persons Act 2006; UK International Development Act 2006; UK Fraud Act 2006; UK Policing and Crime Act 2009, UK Local Democracy Act 2009; UK Bribery Act 2010; and UK Crime and Security Act 2010. TradeMark SALLY RAMAGE ® (2005-2025) in the UK, 2401827; WIPO TradeMark SALLY RAMAGE® 900614; USA TradeMark 3,440,910) (2008-2028). WARNING: The doing of an unauthorized act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. -/- ABSTRACT The privilege of the right to silence can be traced back to the 12th century, becoming more developed in later centuries. -/- Table of cases European Court of Human Rights Deweer v Belgium [1980], Eckle v Germany [1982], DN v The Netherlands [1975], Funke v France [1993] 16 EHRR 297, JP v Austria [1989], Kansal v UK [2003] Application No 21413/02 Khan v UK [2000] 31 EHRR 45, Saunders v UK [1997] 23 EHRR 313, Schenk v Switzerland [1991] 13 EHRR 242, and Tora Tolmos v Spain [1995] Table of Cases United Kingdom Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline, [2000] , The Times, Feb 14, High Ct Scot.; HM Advocate v Friel [1978] SLT; Lambe v Munster [1882] 10 QBD 110.; Pearse v Pearse [1846] Eng Rep 950 (on truth); Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2003] HL; R v Bryce [1992] 95 Cr App Rep 320; R v Canale [1990] 2 All ER 187; R v Fitzpatrick [1995] 4 SCR 154; R v Herbert [1990] 2 SCR 151; R V Hertfordshire County Council, ex parte Green Environmental Industries and another [2000] 1 All ER 773; R v Keenan [1989] Crim LR 720; R v Maguire [1990] Cr App Rep 115; R v Pound, Green and ors [2004]; R v Sang [1979] Crim LR 655; R v Saunders [1986] unreported; R v Seelig, R v Spens [1991] CA; R v Smith [1992] 95 Cr App. R. 191; R v Steen and ors [2003] unreported; R v Walsh [1981] CrimLR 822; R V Ward 96 Cr App R [1993]; R v Weekes [1993] Crim LR 211; R v White [1999] 2 SCR 417; R v Young [2003] unreported; Thompson Newspaper v Canada [1990] 1 SCR 425; Walsh Automation (Europe) Ltd v Bridgeman and ors [2002] EWHC 1344 QB France-Law France 1789 Declaration des driots de l‟homme et du citoyen 1808 Code d ‟instruction criminelle 1946 Constitution 1958 Code de procedure penale 2000 Penal Code Germany-Law Germany 1871 Criminal Code 1877 Criminal Procedure Code (St PO) 1877 Judicial Organisation Law 1949 Constitution 1975 Criminal Code 1998 Criminal Code Table of Cases Germany Germany BGH Admissibility of secret tape recordings judgement 14 June 1960, in BGHSt 14, 358 BGH Lie detector judgement 16 Feb 1954, in BGHSt 5, 332. BberfG Decision concerning the applicability of ne bis in idem 31 March 1987, in BberfGE 75,1; BGH Sweeping deception of suspect judgement 24 August 1988, in BGHSt 36, 328. BGH Judgement 24 August 1993, in BGHSt 39, 305 Table of Cases United States United States of America California v Byres [1971] 402 U.S. 424; Fisher v United States 475 U.S. 391 [1986]; Griffin v California [1965] 380 US 609 [; Hoffman v United States [1950] 341 U.S. 479; Supreme Court Baldwin v NY, 399 US 143 [1970]; Supreme Court Chavez v Martinez , U.S. 123 [2003]; Supreme Court Doyle v Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 [1976]; Supreme Court Escobedo v Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [1964]; Supreme Court Giglio v US, 405 U.S. 150 [1972] Supreme Court Harris v NY, 401 U.S. 222 [1971]; Supreme Court Kirby v Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 [1972]; Supreme Court Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [1966]; Supreme Court Moore v Illinois, 408 U.S. 768 [1972]; Supreme Court Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S. [1986]; Supreme Court Orzoco v Texas, 324 U.S.24 [1969]; Supreme Court US v Hale [1975] 422 US 17; Supreme Court US v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 [1984]; Supreme Court US v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 [1987]; Twining v New Jersey 211 US 78 113 -/- . (shrink)

Studie recenzuje díla: Sam HARRIS, The Moral Landscape a Patricia Smith CHURCHLAND, Braintrust. Cílem recenzní stati je vyzdvihnout hlubokou shodu v naturalistickém pojetí etiky u obou autorů a upozornit na některé nedostatky jejich argumentace.

My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is the (...) theory of “Constitutional Textualism”—or just plain “Textualism”—which says that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely within the “four corners” of the document. Second is the theory of “Originalism,” which says that this meaning was fixed at the time of ratification. (Likewise, the meanings of the amendments were fixed at the time of their ratification.) -/- While Justice Scalia helped to inspire a Textualist/Originalist (and anti-substantive-due-process) movement, his Originalism has received far more attention than his Textualism. Since Judge Robert Bork first introduced Originalism to the general public during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987, this theory has ignited passions on all sides and effectively re-framed the entire debate about how to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional scholars, left and right, now define themselves as either for or against Originalism. Meanwhile, Textualism has merely retreated into the background. -/- Part of the reason for this disparate treatment is that many who reject Originalism still consider themselves to be Textualists. They agree with Justice Scalia (and Judge Bork) that the text is all-important. They disagree, however, that its meaning was fixed for eternity at ratification. Instead, they maintain that either the meaning of the text or applications of this meaning to new cases can change as society changes. -/- In this Article, I bring Textualism out of Originalism’s shadow and into broad daylight. I argue that once we dig just a little deeper into the proposition that all of the meaning in the Constitution inheres in its words, we find that this theory simply cannot work. In order to interpret the nation’s foundational document, we must resort to assumptions that it does not explicitly state. (Indeed, even Textualism itself is a theory that the Constitution does not explicitly endorse.) And the notion that “extra-textual” assumptions necessarily inform our interpretations of the Constitution poses a direct and insurmountable threat to Textualism. -/- The Constitution actually requires each judge, when faced with a case concerning the right to privacy, not merely to consider the text but also to anticipate and evaluate the moral, social, and political consequences of both possible decisions before choosing between them. While this position may initially sound counterintuitive, it turns out to be a much more realistic theory of constitutional interpretation than Textualism (and Originalism). -/- I ultimately conclude that, contrary to Justice Scalia, the Constitution most certainly does protect a right to privacy. For what it’s worth, the Obergefell majority agree with me (and oppose Justice Scalia). I aim to show exactly why they are correct. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions concerning ectogestation are trending. And given that the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Roe v. Wade (1973) and Casey v. Planned Parenthood (1992), questions regarding the moral and legal status of abortion in light of the advent of ectogestation will likely continue to be of central importance in the coming years. If ectogestation can intersect with or even determine abortion policy in the future, then a new philosophical analysis of the legal status of abortion is both (...) warranted and urgently needed. I argue that, even if there is no ‘moral’ right to fetal destruction once ectogestation becomes a reality, societies ought not to implement legal prohibitions on a pregnant person’s ability to safely obtain an abortion that results in fetal death because such laws are systemically misogynistic. (shrink)

Abortion restrictions are particularly good for black women—at least in the United States. This claim will likely strike many as outlandish. And numerous commentaries on abortion restrictions have suggested otherwise: many authors have lamented the effects of abortion restrictions on women, and black women in particular—these restrictions are bad for them, these authors say. However, abortion restrictions are clearly good for black women. This is because if someone is prevented from performing a morally wrong action, it’s good for her. For (...) example, it’s good for Sarah if she’s prevented from driving home drunk. However, since abortion is morally wrong, it follows that it’s good for women when they are prevented from getting an abortion. And since black women get abortions at disproportionately high rates, abortion restrictions are good in particular for black women. Indeed, this is an example of a positive effect of intersectionality. (shrink)

The author addresses speech restrictions on campuses, the axiom “A is A” as it applies to men and women, Roe v. Wade and its effect on examining the definition of personhood, and how this examination may have contributed to the anti-conceptual mentality that was already under way on campuses and elsewhere.

In recent years, comparisons between abortion and slavery have become increasingly common in American pro-life politics. Some have compared the struggle to extinguish abortion rights to the struggle to end slavery. Others have claimed that Roe v Wade is the Dred Scott of our time. Still others have argued that abortion is worse than slavery; it is a form of genocide. This paper tracks the abortion = slavery meme from Ronald Reagan to the current personhood movement, drawing on work by (...) Orlando Patterson, Hortense Spillers, and Saidiya Hartman to develop a discourse of reproductive justice that grapples with the wounded kinship of slavery and racism. (shrink)

Lawrence Nelson (2018) criticizes conscientious objection (CO) to abortion statutes as far as they permit health care providers to escape criminal liability for what would otherwise be the legally wrongful taking of a pregnant woman’s life by refusing treatment (i.e. abortion). His key argument refers to the U.S. Supreme Court judgment (Roe v. Wade 1973) that does not treat the unborn as constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Nelson claims that within the U.S. legal system any vital interests of (...) pregnant women must always take precedence over fetuses’ interests. While agreeing with the main thesis of the article, we believe that the author’s argument neither vindicates his claim, nor explains why those who believe that fetuses are equally protectable human beings do not have the right to refuse to perform an abortion in lifethreatening emergency circumstances (AE). Therefore, the main aim of our commentary is to outline, by referring to our earlier works on conscientious objection in health care (Z_ uradzki 2016) and cultural exemptions (Ciszewski 2016), a better and universalizable argumentative path that would lead to the same conclusion. (shrink)

The scholarship on the ethics of abortion was stimulated by the legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973. The recent overturning of Roe v Wade will likely have the same effect. This book discusses the libertarian perspective on the subject, drawing attention to the implications of self-ownership, Lockean appropriation and abandonment, private property rights, and so on. Much ground is covered, from history to the Supreme Court decisions to natural law to ensoulment. Choice sheds new philosophical light on (...) this thorny issue. (shrink)

In the consolidated cases Altitude Express v. Zarda, Bostock v. Clayton County, and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC, the Supreme Court will decide whether or not Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Although the parties disagree as to the appropriate formulation of a but-for test to determine whether or not there was a discriminatory outcome, all parties do agree to the use of such a test, which asks “whether the evidence (...) shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’” City of Los Angeles, Dep’t. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). However, but-for tests confuse more than they clarify the inquiry; a discriminatory outcome cannot be explained by appeal to just a discrete characteristic of a particular person. Individuals are not discriminated against because of these characteristics per se. Rather, they are discriminated against because of the social meanings and expectations that attach to these characteristics. Beyoncé and Taylor Swift illustrate the difference between individual-level causation and social explanation in two separate songs, “If I Were a Boy” and “The Man.” The explanation for why the counterfactual ‘male’ Beyoncé and Swift are evaluated differently than their current ‘female’ versions does not lie in individual-level features considered apart from the social world, but in social-level roles and expectations associated with those features. For this reason, a social explanation test—one that asks whether the social meanings of sex characteristics, rather than the characteristics per se, explain the outcome in question—is more suitable for determining whether or not Title VII has been violated. (shrink)

Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine (...) months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way. (shrink)

Concentrados e Rações Para Cabras em Lactação -/- ___________________________________________________________________________ De um modo geral, há grande dificuldade nas criações zootécnicas nacionais para a formulação e uso racional de concentrados nas rações dos animais, neste caso, de caprinos, em especial, para cabras em lactação. O problema torna-se real e complexo em função das particularidades apresentadas pelos animais relativas ao seu trato digestivo, além de seus hábitos alimentares. Uma séria dificuldade relacionada com a tomada de decisão no momento da formulação da ração concentrada (...) reside na qualidade do volumoso utilizado. Esse volumoso possui uma qualidade bromatológica variável, na maioria das vezes, seja pelo manejo inadequado da forrageira ou do próprio ciclo vegetativo da planta utilizada. O solo também possui grande impacto nas características químicas da forrageira disponibilizada para os animais. Dada a variabilidade da qualidade da ração volumosa, o concentrado torna-se mal balanceado, sendo fornecido em quantidades inadequadas, favorecendo uma sub ou super alimentação, o que acarreta níveis de produção insatisfatórios e grande prejuízo para a indústria caprina, uma vez que afetará diretamente as características químicas e físicas do leite da cabra, mudando seus teores de sólidos totais etc. -/- OS NUTRIENTES E SUA IMPORT NCIA Muitos nutrientes são necessários na dieta da cabra para a realização do metabolismo normal, para a manutenção das funções corporais e para a produção que inclui acréscimo de tecido (animal em crescimento), para a reprodução e sua manutenção e, por fim, para a produção dos produtos como carne, leite e fibra. As classes específicas de nutrientes incluem carboidratos e lipídeos que fornecem energia; nitrogênio proteico ou não proteico que fornecem aminoácidos e energia; vitaminas; minerais e água. Embora seja ignorada por muitos autores, a água é um nutriente necessário para a digestão, metabolismo e produção. -/- Energia -/- A eficiência da utilização dos alimentos depende de um suprimento adequado de energia, uma vez que o processo de utilização dos alimentos requer gasto energético, sendo, portanto, de grande importância o suprimento energético para a produtividade dos caprinos. A deficiência energética retarda o crescimento e desenvolvimento de cabritos, aumenta a idade à puberdade, reduz a fertilidade e diminui a produção leiteira. Uma deficiência persistente acarreta redução na resistência a doenças infecciosas e parasitárias. A baixa resistência imunológica associada a deficiência energética ainda pode ser agravada mediante o déficit de outros princípios nutritivos como proteínas, vitaminas e minerais. O consumo inapropriado de energia resulta na inadequada ingestão de alimentos ou na baixa qualidade da dieta fornecida para o caprino. A baixa ingestão de energia também pode ser causada pelas altas quantidades de água presentes em algumas forrageiras in natura, por isso o ideal é o fornecimento de volumosos na sua matéria seca, onde será disponibilizado somente os nutrientes, segundo suas características bromatológicas. Segundo DA SILVA & FONTAIN, 2021 a base de qualquer ração é a energia, e se houver uma deficiência existente, os demais nutrientes e os aditivos serão subutilizados pelos animais. Os ruminantes possuem a capacidade de utilização energética através dos carboidratos complexos como celulose, hemicelulose, pectina etc., que estão presentes nas forragens, essa utilização acontece graças ao processo de fermentação que ocorre no rúmen. Entretanto, assim como ocorre em monogástricos, também possuem a capacidade de utilização de demais carboidratos como amido e açúcares. Os ruminantes exigem determinada quantidade de fibra, mas dependendo do animal, do nível de produção e dos ingredientes da ração, há necessidade de incluir na ração os denominados concentrados energéticos. Por exemplo as rações ricas em volumosos (alimentos fibrosos) não podem atender os requisitos energéticos em razão das limitações físicas do animal para ingerir uma quantidade suficiente de alimento, isto é, para atender suas exigências seria necessário grandes quantidades de ração volumosa ingerida, o que é impossível devido a capacidade do rúmen. Neste caso, para se reduzir o volume de ração ingerida, há necessidade de substituir parte dos alimentos fibrosos por concentrados energéticos de boa qualidade. Tais considerações são suficientes para aclarar a importância do aporte de energia no balanceamento de rações para cabras em lactação. -/- Proteínas -/- As proteínas exercem várias funções no organismo do animal e, desse modo, tornam- -se essenciais à alimentação. Elas são necessárias, por exemplo, para a manutenção do organismo, para reparos e formação dos tecidos que são continuamente desgastados, na manutenção dos processos fisiológicos, no crescimento de fetos e dos animais jovens e na síntese do leite. Os ruminantes, assim como outros animais, necessitam de vários componentes na dieta para desempenharem suas funções produtivas e reprodutivas. Esses componentes são chamados essenciais, do qual sem a sua presença os animais não poderiam sobreviver. Entre eles estão as fontes de nitrogênio proteico e não proteico que, após transformações fisiológicas e metabólicas, dão origem a proteínas que são digeridas, absorvidas e utilizadas pelos ruminantes (FERREIRA, 1983). As proteínas destacam-se, dentro das substâncias essenciais, pela amplitude de funções que desempenham no organismo. Estas participam desde a estruturação do corpo (músculos, cartilagens, unhas, pele e pelos), até mecanismos complexos de transporte e metabolismo. Portanto, dentre o supracitado, é essencial conhecer os principais concentrados proteicos e seus limites de utilização, visando o melhor aproveitamento destes, desde a esfera econômica até o impacto positivo sobre a produção de produtos caprinos. -/- Minerais -/- Existem pelo menos 15 minerais essenciais para a nutrição dos ruminantes, dentre os macronutrientes, isto é, os exigidos em maior quantidade na dieta, estão o cálcio, fósforo, sódio, cloro, magnésio, potássio e enxofre, e dentre os micronutrientes, ou seja, exigidos em menor quantidade, porém essenciais a sua presença, estão o ferro, iodo, zinco, cobre, manganês, cobalto, molibdênio e selênio. Em qualquer região, concentrações tóxicas de minerais como cobre, flúor, manganês, molibdênio ou selênio causam redução na produção e produtividade animal. As deficiências minerais ou desequilíbrio destes no solo e nas forrageiras cultivadas neste, têm sido responsáveis pelos baixos índices reprodutivos, ou seja, tais déficits ocasionam perdas nos processos reprodutivos normais, além de causar inadequada produtividade em diversas regiões do Brasil. Segundo dados apresentados por SOUSA, 1983 os caprinos sob pastagens, com elevados déficits de fósforo, cobalto ou cobre, podem apresentar perdas superiores relativas a produção cárnea e láctea em relação aos animais criados sob pastagens com déficits de energia e/ou proteína. Os macrominerais presentes na ração (volumosa ou concentrada) chegam ao rúmen e são dissolvidos, desempenhando uma série de funções importantes, além das específicas nas células e nos tecidos. Dentre elas incluem-se a mantença de um pH constante através da formação da solução tamponante, mantença de um potencial de redução e da pressão osmótica no rúmen. Os micronutrientes, por sua vez, possuem mais funções específicas na célula e no tecido, atuando como constituintes de coenzimas, catalizadores etc. (COELHO DA SILVA & LEÃO, 1979). Assim, torna-se indispensável conhecer as fontes dos minerais e a melhor maneira de utilizá-los durante o preparo de concentrados para cabras em lactação. -/- Vitaminas -/- Os caprinos necessitam fontes alimentares de vitaminas lipossolúveis (A, D, E e K), entretanto os microrganismos do rúmen, através do metabolismo e fermentação, produzem quantidades suficientes de vitaminas hidrossolúveis. Os animais em pastejo somente obtém suficientes quantidades de vitaminas ou precursores de vitaminas para satisfazer as necessidades, porém pode ser necessário a adição complementar de suplementos vitamínicos aos animais alimentados em confinamento ou com altas produções leiteiras. Os ruminantes exigem todas as vitaminas que são metabolicamente essenciais para os monogástricos. Essa indicação tem sido obtida através de estudos sobre as exigências vitamínicas em animais jovens, antes do desenvolvimento completo e funcionamento adequado do rúmen, ou com o emprego de inibidores da vitamina em estudo e observando-se a consequente manifestação do sintoma de deficiência. O suprimento de vitaminas do complexo B e da vitamina K para o ruminante é feito em decorrência das fermentações que ocorrem no aparelho digestivo. Entretanto, existem algumas dúvidas se a síntese de algumas vitaminas do complexo B é adequada para manter altos níveis de produção e uma alta taxa de crescimento. Como supracitado, existem inúmeras informações de que a maioria das vitaminas possam ser sintetizadas ou no trato gastrointestinal ou nos tecidos. Entretanto, as vitaminas A, D e E devem ser fornecidas ao animal (ARAÚJO & ZANETTI, 2019). As principais funções das vitaminas do complexo B estão relacionadas com o eficiente aproveitamento dos açúcares, gorduras e proteínas dos alimentos. A vitamina C possui papel imprescindível no metabolismo geral dos nutrientes. Quanto à vitamina K, sua função mais relatada é como fator anti-hemorrágico, agindo na coagulação do sangue (VELLOSO, 1983). Quanto à vitamina A, sabemos que não existe nos vegetais, entretanto o caroteno presente é um precursor desta, onde este sofre metabolismo e se transforma em vitamina A no organismo do animal, por isso, muitas vezes é relatado como pró-vitamina A. Os ruminantes são excelentes animais quando se fala na transformação de ß-carotenos em vitamina A. A coloração verde das plantas forrageiras é uma garantia da presença de pigmentos carotenoides nelas. Assim, durante a época das águas (chuvas), quando as forrageiras consumidas estão verdes, não há qualquer problema quanto ao suprimento de pró-vitamina A. Por sua vez, quando as pastagens estão amareladas e secas, pode aumentar a possibilidade do aparecimento de sintomas de deficiência de vitamina A, e esse problema pode ser agravado conforme aumenta-se o período de estiagem (VELLOSO, 1983). Deve-se dar especial atenção às cabras em lactação que, na maioria dos casos, recebem ração à base de fenos, que muitas vezes são mal conservados e apresentam pequeno conteúdo de ß-caroteno. As dietas típicas para caprinos contêm quantidades de caroteno suficientes para prevenir possíveis deficiências de vitamina A. O hábito alimentar dos caprinos sob pastejo, isto é, sua tendência de selecionar as partes mais verdes da planta coloca-os em vantagem em relação a outros ruminantes, entretanto, na ausência de partes verdes essa vantagem não possui importância. A deficiência de vitamina A em caprinos criados nos trópicos é rara, exceto nas condições supracitadas (DA SILVA et. al., 2021). A vitamina E apresenta uma deficiência ocasional em caprinos, embora essa vitamina, que é transferida através do leite, seja considerada essencial em função de suas propriedades antioxidantes (DA SILVA et. al., 2021). A vitamina D é relatada como fator anti-raquítico, dada sua propriedade em prevenir o raquitismo através de duas vias conhecidas, seja pelo aumento da absorção de cálcio dietético pelo intestino delgado ou pela mobilização deste, presente nos ossos. Além de evitar o raquitismo em animais jovens, a vitamina D também atua na integridade corporal dos adultos. Os caprinos expostos à luz solar por alguns minutos diariamente conseguem receber vitamina D em quantidades suficientes para suas necessidades fisiológicas, esse recebimento de vitamina D acontece através da conversão do 7-dehidrocolesterol da pele em vitamina D3, portanto a vitamina D3 é uma pró-vitamina. Assim, em animais mantidos em regime de pastejo, nas condições brasileiras, não há maior preocupação quanto ao suprimento de vitamina D3 (VELLOSO, 1983). Entretanto, os animais em regime de confinamento total, onde não possuem acesso à luz solar, devem receber atenção especial, uma vez que podem ocorrer deficiência desta vitamina, esta que pode ser evitada mediante o fornecimento da vitamina na mistura concentrada. -/- Água -/- Muitos autores da área de nutrição animal, seja em artigos ou livros, desconsideram a água como nutriente essencial para os animais, entretanto ela é imprescindível para inúmeras funções metabólicas. Além da água de bebida, os caprinos obtêm água através dos alimentos consumidos na matéria natural, da neve derretida e através do orvalho. A necessidade de água se deve a três motivos, primeiro pela excreção de água nas fezes e na urina ligada à utilização digestiva e metabólica dos alimentos; segundo pela fixação e exportação de água nas produções (carne, leite, pele e fibra); e, por fim, pelas perdas de vapor de água pelos pulmões e através da pele. O total de água requerida varia segundo o tamanho e condição fisiológica do animal, a temperatura ambiental e o nível de ingestão de matéria seca do animal. A ingestão de água é expressa em kg de água necessária por kg de matéria seca ingerida. Nas condições brasileiras, onde a temperatura fica acima dos 30 ºC, normalmente, o ideal de fornecimento é de 6-10 kg de água/kg de IMS. O consumo total é estimado em 3,5 kg de água/kg de leite produzido. Segundo DA SILVA & AIRES, 2018 as recomendações são de 145,6 g de água/kg de peso metabólico (kg0,75) para mantença e 1,43 kg/kg de leite produzido. Para aclarar os dados, suponhamos uma cabra em lactação com 40 kg de PV e produção de 5 kg de leite/dia, seu consumo será de 145,6 g x 400,75 = 2,32 kg de água para mantença + 1,43 x 5 = 7,15 kg de água, seu consumo total será 9,47 kg de água/dia. É necessário enfatizar que, à medida que a temperatura ambiental aumenta, os requisitos de água também aumentam. Em condições semidesérticas os caprinos adaptam-se, bebendo água apenas duas vezes por semana. A equação de necessidade de água, segundo DA SILVA & AIRES, 2018, é: ingestão total de água (L/dia) = 3,86 x IMS - 0,99. REQUISITOS NUTRICIONAIS -/- Para que possamos formular uma dieta balanceada e que os concentrados possam ser utilizados eficazmente e racionalmente, primeiramente é necessário conhecer as exigências nutricionais das cabras em lactação. Esses requerimentos são, na verdade, aproximações dos valores reais das exigências dos animais. Normalmente, os requisitos são tabulados, visando a facilidade no manejo de informações, entendimento e utilização dos dados na prática. Infelizmente, no Brasil não existem tabelas das exigências nutricionais dos caprinos e, com isso, é imperativo a utilização de dados obtidos em outros países e que possuem condições climáticas e animais diferentes, o que nem sempre corresponde à realidade brasileira. Os dados mais utilizados para estabelecimento das exigências são os do NRC nos Estados Unidos, AFRC na Inglaterra, CSIRO na Austrália, INRA na França e FEDNA na Espanha. A tabela 1 apresenta os requisitos nutricionais de ingestão de matéria seca de cabras leiteiras segundo a equação proposta pelo AFRC. É importante levar em consideração todos os fatores que afetam as exigências das cabras, tais como exigências de mantença, gestação, crescimento, atividade física, lactação, clima, raça etc. Os valores apresentados na tabela 2 devem ser incluídos aos valores de mantença. Os requerimentos completos dos caprinos podem ser tomados nas tabelas 3 a 19 do livro Formulação de Ração Para Caprinos. Como supracitado, os valores das exigências para produção de leite devem ser adicionados aos de mantença, por sua vez a tabela 3 apresenta os valores de produção que devem ser múltiplos dos requisitos de mantença. Existem formulações que levam em consideração a porcentagem de nutrientes no conteúdo total do concentrado. Diversos autores publicam quantidades de proteína, nutrientes digestíveis totais, cálcio e fósforo com base na matéria seca da ração. DA SILVA, 2021 sugere que para cabras em lactação com uma ou duas crias é ideal um concentrado com 14 a 16% de proteína bruta. Uma formulação para cabras em lactação, segundo DA SILVA, 2021, pode obedecer a ordem de 3 a 5% de IMS, 16 a 24% de proteína bruta, 65% de nutrientes digestíveis totais e minerais na ordem de 0,75% Ca e 0,3% P. O teor de nutrientes na mistura concentrada é importante para saber se a ração irá atender às exigências das cabras em lactação (tabela 8). O conhecimento dos níveis de nutrientes na mistura é essencial para elaborar uma ração balanceada que atenda aos requisitos de mantença e de produção. É importante, também, saber as observações quanto a relação entre energia/proteína e entre os minerais para que não haja um mau aproveitamento dos nutrientes e possíveis distúrbios metabólicos. ALIMENTOS CONCENTRADOS -/- Por definição, são aqueles que possuem conteúdo de fibra bruta inferior a 18%. Eles são divididos em concentrados proteicos e energéticos, quando possuem mais ou menos de 20% de proteína bruta, respectivamente. Um grande número de alimentos pode ser usado no balanceamento das misturas de concentrados na propriedade e deve permitir uma formulação equilibrada nutricionalmente, economicamente e de boa qualidade. As tabelas 9 e 10 apresentam a composição de alguns alimentos concentrados considerados mais comuns na formulação de dietas e de maior disponibilidade no Brasil. As recomendações para utilização de concentrados nas rações de cabras leiteiras podem variar em função dos demais ingredientes da ração total. De modo geral, quanto aos concentrados energéticos, não existem restrições às quantidades usadas na ração, desde que as exigências nutricionais sejam atendidas. A tabela 11 apresenta as restrições de utilização dos ingredientes na ração de caprinos. De tal forma pode ser pensado para os concentrados proteicos, entretanto, nesse caso, exige-se mais cuidado por parte do formulador, uma vez que deve-se levar em consideração a carga energética presente no ingrediente proteico. Deve-se enfatizar sempre que a utilização de ingredientes de origem animal é expressamente proibida na alimentação de ruminantes. Deve-se, ainda, referenciar quanto ao uso de fontes de nitrogênio não proteico (NNP) (ureia, biureto etc.) que podem ser usadas com vantagens nas dietas com alta carga energética. O critério de uso de NNP, em até ⅓ da proteína total da dieta, ainda pode ser utilizado de forma generalizada. RECOMENDAÇÕES PARA USO DAS MISTURAS DE CONCENTRADOS -/- Qualquer tipo de alimento concentrado pode ser usado no preparo de uma mistura de boa qualidade, entretanto os requerimentos das cabras devem ser atendidos. Sendo assim, o preço e a disponibilidade dos alimentos básicos são fatores importantes na escolha dos ingredientes. Conforme supracitado, a composição da mistura concentrada depende da qualidade do volumoso. Para que o produtor tenha garantia e controle de que as exigências estão sendo supridas, é recomendável o ajuste periódico das quantidades de concentrados que serão fornecidas. Esse ajuste é necessário em função da mudança da composição química das forrageiras com o avanço da maturidade fisiológica da planta. Essa composição normalmente existe em tabelas, entretanto as melhores aproximações são obtidas quando se faz a análise destas forrageiras em laboratórios especializados. É difícil fazer uma recomendação única para fornecimento de concentrado para cabras em lactação. Cada propriedade dispõe de recursos forrageiros peculiares, com variações na qualidade nutricional. Não obstante, os valores apresentados na tabela 12 podem servir de guia quando há impossibilidade de realização de um balanceamento específico para cada propriedade. É essencial a verificação dos níveis de outros nutrientes, tais como energia e minerais. Em geral, a preocupação é dada somente à proteína e, muitas vezes, a energia é negligenciada. O conteúdo de energia da ração (EM, EL ou NDT) muitas vezes se apresenta deficiente, o que possui relação direta com os índices de produção e produtividade insatisfatórios. Este é um dos pontos de limitação da produção leiteira, principalmente porque escapa à capacidade de observação do criador. Quando alimentadas com forrageiras de média ou baixa qualidade, é necessário completar os requerimentos de mantença das cabras e, dependendo da qualidade da forrageira disponível, recomenda-se de 200 a 500 g de concentrado/cabeça/dia. As fontes de NNP também podem ser utilizadas para cabras em lactação, desde que não ultrapasse ⅓ do nitrogênio total da dieta. Em termos práticos, a ureia deve constituir até 1% da matéria seca total da dieta ou, aproximadamente, 3% da mistura de concentrados. Uma adaptação gradativa é necessária para que os caprinos possam aproveitar eficazmente a ureia sem distúrbios. Essa adaptação é feita com níveis crescentes de ureia adicionados ao concentrado na base de 0,5% por semana até a limitação. Desta forma, na sexta semana, as cabras estarão recebendo concentrado contendo 3% do elemento. No caso de cabras de alta produção leiteira, é essencial dar atenção aos minerais, uma vez que elas não conseguem ingerir as quantidades exigidas para sua mantença e produção. Para mitigar o problema, recomenda-se adicionar ao concentrado ou à mistura concentrada um premix, isto é, uma mistura vitamínico-mineral completa ao nível de 3%. As rações comerciais também podem ser utilizadas, desde que se verifiquem os níveis de garantia, tanto de qualidade como de composição. É importante que se evite rações com altos níveis de proteína, onde, normalmente, não possuem boa relação energia/proteína. Essas rações, em geral, não são bem aproveitadas pelas cabras, onerando o custo de produção de leite. É importante sempre frisar que um máximo cuidado deve ser dado ao estado de conservação dos ingredientes. As condições de armazenamento devem ser as melhores possíveis, procurando-se locais secos e com boa ventilação. Alimentos rancificados, de uma forma geral, são rejeitados pelas cabras. No caso de utilização de alimentos com alto conteúdo de matéria graxa, que se rancificam facilmente, deve-se ter cuidados especiais, evitando-se preparar grandes quantidades de uma só vez. Outro ponto que merece destaque é a presença de bolores. Os alimentos mofados devem ser sistematicamente eliminados, pois além de causar danos à saúde do animal, podem também ocasionar problemas para a saúde humana. Intoxicações por aflatoxina são frequentemente relatadas em caprinos. Assim, o uso de ingredientes suscetíveis ao fungo (Aspergillus flavus) que produz aflatoxina, deve ser feito com ressalvas. É imprescindível salientar que essas toxinas também podem ser produzidas por outros fungos e podem estar presentes em uma série de alimentos em más condições de armazenamento. O local de armazenamento dos ingredientes ou da mistura concentrada deve possuir boa vedação para não permitir a entrada de insetos e/ou roedores. A proliferação de insetos, além de causar danos físicos aos alimentos, uma vez que se alimentam de alguns princípios nutritivos, produz um aquecimento em função dos processos metabólicos dos insetos, o que reduz as características do alimento e seu valor nutritivo. É essencial que o local seja à prova de roedores, pois além do grande desperdício de ração, causado pelo consumo e danos às embalagens, os roedores também são vetores de doenças que causam sérios prejuízos e perdas ao criatório. Na maioria dos casos, essas doenças escapam à capacidade de observação do criador. As cabras devem ser alimentadas segundo sua produção. Neste caso, é importante que a alimentação seja individual. Pode-se fornecer a ração durante a ordenha ou no intervalo do fornecimento da ração volumosa, porém sempre em horário previamente estabelecido. A mistura concentrada pode ser fornecida em cochos coletivos, mas é necessário a instalação de canzis para a contenção dos animais. É essencial que, antes do fornecimento, os cochos estejam limpos para permitir um melhor aproveitamento. Os concentrados muito farelados devem ser evitados durante a ordenha, uma vez que podem afetar a qualidade do leite pelo aumento da possibilidade de contaminação com poeira. As cabras de alta produção devem receber a ração concentrada dividida em duas ou três refeições no dia para permitir melhor aproveitamento. O fornecimento da mistura concentrada juntamente com a ração volumosa não é recomendável, mesmo que esta seja de baixa qualidade, porque de forma geral causam desperdício. No caso de cabras semi-confinadas, a prática da mistura de concentrados com os volumosos pode facilitar e agilizar o arraçoamento. Neste caso, também se faz recomendável a disposição de canzis nos comedouros para evitar a competição entre os animais. -/- RAÇÕES PARA CABRAS EM LACTAÇÃO -/- As rações de cabras em produção de leite devem ser de boa qualidade, produzidas em ambiente higienizado e com normas de segurança, além de, no caso de armazenamento, serem armazenadas em ambiente limpo, arejado e fora do alcance de insetos e roedores. Além das condições de fabricação e armazenagem, a ração, quando formulada, deverá obedecer os requisitos nutricionais das cabras para sua mantença e para a produção de leite. Sabemos que quanto maior a produção mais nutritiva deverá ser a ração. O fornecimento de ração volumosa também é essencial para o funcionamento normal do rúmen, além de fornecer uma carga nutricional. A relação entre volumoso e concentrado é importante, um não pode se sobressair em excesso sobre o outro, caso aconteça, haverá um desbalanceamento e consequente baixa na produção e produtividade. O limite de utilização dos ingredientes concentrados também é importante, caso haja uma incorporação maior de um dado ingrediente, poderá haver perdas significativas; por exemplo, se houver maior incorporação de ureia poderá haver intoxicação do animal. Na sequência, são apresentadas rações para cabras em lactação formuladas e disponíveis no livro sobre formulação de ração para caprinos do mesmo autor, exemplos 2 e seção rações prontas para caprinos números 2, 3, 4 e 21. A primeira ração formulada é para uma cabra da raça Saanen com 50 kg de PV e produção leiteira de 5 kg/dia com teor de gordura de 3,5%. A ração é composta por volumoso e concentrado, conforme tabela 13. Tomando os requerimentos da cabra em questão e a composição química da dieta, observamos que a dieta volumosa e concentrada supre todas as exigências nutricionais do animal (tabela 13.1). A seguir, são apresentadas misturas de volumosos e concentrados para cabras em lactação, conforme as recomendações dadas por DA SILVA, 2021 sobre os níveis nutricionais de rações para a categoria. Segundo o autor, a composição industrial de um concentrado deve ser de 16 a 24% de proteína bruta, 65% de nutrientes digestíveis totais, 0,75% de Ca e 0,3% de P, seguindo um CMS de 3 a 5% do peso vivo. Tais valores são genéricos, o ideal é consultar as tabelas de exigências das cabras. Os valores das misturas supracitadas, tanto de quantidade como de composição, são genéricos e podem variar em função de alguns fatores, os mais importantes são composição bromatológica dos ingredientes e das exigências nutricionais das cabras. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ARAÚJO, L. F.; ZANETTI, M. A. (Eds.). Nutrição Animal, 1ª ed. Barueri: Manole, 2019. COELHO DA SILVA, J. F. Concentrados energéticos para ruminantes. Informe Agropecuário, v. 9, n. 108, p. 37-42, 1983. COELHO DA SILVA, J. F.; LEÃO, M. I. Fundamentos de nutrição dos ruminantes. Piracicaba: Livroceres, 1979. 380 p. CRAMPTON, Earle W.; HARRIS, Lorin E. Nutrición animal aplicada: el uso de los alimentos en la formulación de raciones para el ganado. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1979. AIRES, P. R. R. Água na nutrição de caprinos e ovinos. In: Seminário da disciplina de Caprino-ovinocultura da professora Drª. Alcilene Maria Andrade Tavares Samay. Curso Técnico em Agropecuária. Belo Jardim: IFPE, 2018. DA SILVA, A. T. M. Rações para cabritos, caprinos a pasto, em mantença, reprodutores e cabras gestantes e em lactação. In: Curso de formulação e fabricação de dietas para ruminantes. São Bento do Una: Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco, 2021. DA SILVA, C. L.; ALVES, A. A. A.; DA SILVA, S. R. P. Minerais e vitaminas na formulação de dietas para ruminantes. In: Curso de formulação e fabricação de dietas para ruminantes. São Bento do Una: Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco, 2021. FONTAIN, E. C. da S. Energia e proteína na formulação de dietas para ruminantes. In: Curso de formulação e fabricação de dietas para ruminantes. São Bento do Una: Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco, 2021. Formulação de Ração Para Caprinos. Belo Jardim, 2021. 97p. FERREIRA, J. J. Proteína e concentrados proteicos na alimentação de ruminantes. Informe Agropecuário, v. 9, n. 108, p. 43-48, 1983. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL et al. Nutrient requirements of small ruminants: sheep, goats, cervids, and new world camelids. 中国法制出版社, 2007. SAMPAIO, J. M. C. et al. Criação de cabras leiteiras. Brasília: EMBRATER, 1984. 243p. Nutrição e Suplementação Mineral de Bovinos de Corte. Curso de Técnico em Agropecuária, Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia de Pernambuco, Belo Jardim, PE. SOLAIMAN, Sandra G. (Ed.). Goat science and production. John Wiley & Sons, 2010. SOUSA, J. C. Os minerais na alimentação dos ruminantes. Informe Agropecuário, v. 9, n. 108, p. 49-57, 1983. VELLOSO, L. Importância das vitaminas para os bovinos. Informe Agropecuário, v. 9, n. 108, p. 63-66, 1983. (shrink)

Many of Søren Kierkegaard's most controversial and influential ideas are more relevant than ever to contemporary debates on ethics, philosophy of religion and selfhood. Kierkegaard develops an original argument according to which wholeheartedness requires both moral and religious commitment. In this book, Roe Fremstedal provides a compelling reconstruction of how Kierkegaard develops wholeheartedness in the context of his views on moral psychology, meta-ethics and the ethics of religious belief. He shows that Kierkegaard's influential account of despair, selfhood, ethics and religion (...) belongs to a larger intellectual context in which German philosophers such as Kant and Fichte play crucial roles. Moreover, Fremstedal makes a solid case for the controversial claim that religion supports ethics, instead of contradicting it. His book offers a novel and comprehensive reading of Kierkegaard, drawing on important sources that are little known. (shrink)

By comparing the theories of evil found in Kant and Kierkegaard, this article aims to shed new light on Kierkegaard, as well as on the historical and conceptual relations between the two philosophers. The author shows that there is considerable overlap between Kant's doctrine of radical evil and Kierkegaard's views on guilt and sin and argues that Kierkegaard approved of the doctrine of radical evil. Although Kierkegaard's distinction between guilt and sin breaks radically with Kant, there are more Kantian elements (...) in Kierkegaard than was shown by earlier scholarship. Finally, Kierkegaard provides an alternative solution to the problem of the universality of guilt, a problem much discussed in the literature on Kant. (shrink)

The present text focuses on what resources Kierkegaard offers for dealing with the question “Why be moral?” I sketch an approach to this question by presenting Kierkegaard’s methodology, his negative arguments against the aesthete and the motive he offers for being moral. I conclude that Kierkegaard does provide motivation for assessing ourselves in moral terms, although his approach is more relevant to deontological ethics and virtue ethics than consequentialism.

The present article deals with religious faith by comparing the so-called double movement of faith in Kierkegaard to Kant's moral faith. Kierkegaard's double movement of faith and Kant's moral faith can be seen as providing different accounts of religious faith, as well as involving different solutions to the problem of realizing the highest good. The double movement of faith in Fear and Trembling provides an account of the structure of faith that helps us make sense of what Kierkegaard means by (...) religious faith in general, as well as to understand better the relation between philosophy and Christian thinking in Kierkegaard. It is argued that previous scholarship has described the relation between Kierkegaard and Kant in a misleading manner by interpreting Kant as an ethicist and overlooking the role of grace in Kant. (shrink)

This essay tries to show that there exist several passages where Kierkegaard (and his pseudonyms) sketches an argument for the existence of God and immortality that is remarkably similar to Kant's so-called moral argument for the existence of God and immortality. In particular, Kierkegaard appears to follow Kant's moral argument both when it comes to the form and content of the argument as well as some of its terminology. The essay concludes that several passages in Kierkegaard overlap significantly with Kant's (...) moral argument, although Kierkegaard ultimately favors revealed faith over natural theology in general and Kant's moral faith in particular. Whereas Kant uses the moral argument to postulate the existence of God and immortality, Kierkegaard mainly uses it as a reductio ad absurdum of non-religious thinking. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good thesis (i.e. that in f-ing intentionally, we take f-ing to be good). Contemporary discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair is relevant to these discussions, because it reconciles demonic (extreme) despair (...) and acedia with the guise of the good. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provides an influential, systematic account of despair that relates evil, despair, and acedia to each other. Michelle Kosch argues that this account goes beyond Kierkegaard’s German predecessors by introducing a concept of diabolic evil and despair. By contrast, the present paper argues that Kierkegaard takes diabolic evil to be impossible, although he offers a rich analysis of the demonic that resembles diabolic agency. Still, Kierkegaard’s analysis rests on ontological assumptions about the nature of the good that belong to a Platonico-Christian tradition that is controversial today. (shrink)

This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...) does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind. (shrink)

This article deals with hope – and its importance – by analysing the little-known analysis of hope found in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard present hope as essential to moral agency, arguingthat hope should never be given up, even if it is not supported by experience. This articlegives an interpretation of the strong claims about the necessity of hope found in Kierkegaardwhich tries to reconstruct some of Kierkegaard’s central claims, arguing that Kierkegaard can be used to sketch a distinction between justified and unjustified (...) hope. (shrink)

Recenzio Kiraly V. Istvan Death and History c. konyverol.

In this paper, I discuss and reject both the idea of a moral order, in which morality and prudence generally coincide, and the idea of a tragic world, in which morality and prudence generally collide. I then discuss and defend an intermediary position in which morality and prudence converge substantially. It is argued that moral agency presuppose friction that prevents morality from coinciding perfectly with prudence. Still, morality and prudence should not be thought of as being fundamentally incompatible, because this (...) would lead to an objectionable dualism of practical reason as well as demoralization. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on how Kierkegaard criticizes both eudaimonism and Kantian autonomy for failing to account for unconditional obligations and genuine other-regard. Like Kant, Kierkegaard argues that eudaimonism makes moral virtue contingent on prudence. Kierkegaard views eudaimonism as an anthropocentric and self-regarding doctrine, which he contrasts not with Kantian autonomy but with theocentrism and proper other-regard. Kierkegaard then criticizes Kantian autonomy in much the same way as he criticizes eudaimonism. Whereas eudaimonism makes morality contingent on prudence, autonomy makes morality contingent (...) on decisions that may be revoked, he argues. As a result, human autonomy can account for hypothetical imperatives but not categorical imperatives. This line of reasoning seems problematic, however, since Kierkegaard takes Kantian autonomy to not only represent a form of moral constructivism, but also a form of moral relativism and decisionism. Still, Kierkegaard’s critique of autonomy indicates that morality and practical rationality need unconditional commitment towards what is objectively good. (shrink)

This article investigates the convergence between Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism. The piece argues that (1) both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche rely on an internal critique of ways of life which collapse on their own terms; (2) both despair and nihilism involve a radical, existential aporia and double-mindedness which can be (3) either conscious or non-conscious; (4) there is some overlap between the main types of nihilism and the different types of inauthentic (non-conscious) despair; (5) finally, a (...) comparison with Nietzsche makes it possible to make sense of inauthentic despair without resorting to theological presuppositions or a twentieth century depth psychology notion of the unconscious. (shrink)

This chapter deals with German philosophy from Leibniz to Fichte, which formed an important part of Kierkegaard's intellectual background. In this period German philosophy came to dominate Danish philosophy. However, Kierkegaard's attitude toward his German predecessors is generally ambivalent, involving both critique and admiration. Although Kierkegaard was fluent in German and very familiar with classic German philosophy, his use of this philosophy is somewhat eclectic and assimilated to his own ends. Kierkegaard uses his German predecessors to develop a distinction between (...) the spheres of existence and thought and to reinforce what he took to be genuine Christian faith. (shrink)

The present text deals with the question of the meaning of life in theexistentialist theory oft heNorwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe(1899–1990). In his book On the Tragic (1941), Zapffe sketched a theory of the human condition where the meaning of life plays a decisive role together with the human need for justice. This paper aims to reconstruct the central elements of Zapffe’s analysis and to discuss them critically by focusing on his claim that human beings need a fundamental meaning of (...) life as a whole that transcends meaning in life. I pay particular attention to Zapffe’s claim that life is meaningless, since the meaning of life is fundamentallylacking.I conclude that Zapffe’s analysis is problematic for reasons both internal and external to his theory. (shrink)

This article aims to show that in his little-known work Denkbewegungen (MS 183), Wittgenstein sketchesan existential philosophy that has been influenced by Kierkegaard. While earlier interpretations of Denkbewegungen stress that this is a diary and tend to favour a biographical orpsychological approach to the diary, I try – with a thematic andhistorical approach − to show that this book sheds new light upon how Wittgenstein was occupied with Kierkegaard (and Christian-ity) on the one hand, and ethics, religion, and existential philoso-phy (...) on the other. Because of this, Denkbewegungen can provideus with a better understanding of how Wittgenstein, during animportant period in the 1930s, developed his thinking. (shrink)

What is a speech act, and what makes it count as one kind of speech act rather than another? In the target article, Geurts considers two ways of answering these questions. His opponent is intentionalism—the view that performing a speech act is a matter of acting with a communicative intention, and that speech acts of different kinds involve intentions to affect hearers in different ways. Geurts offers several objections to intentionalism. Instead, he articulates and defends an admirably clear and resolute (...) version of the view that performing a speech act is a matter of undertaking a social commitment. Different kinds of speech acts, on his view, involve social commitments of different kinds. My aim is to respond to Geurts on behalf of intentionalism. I’ll argue that his objections aren’t all that worrying (Section 3), that Geurts’ view suffers from some quite serious problems that intentionalists don’t face (Section 4), and that intentionalists can give a principled account of the ways that speech acts give rise to commitments (Section 5). First I will spell out the two opposing views (Sections 1–2). (shrink)

This article provides a critical assessment of Habermas’s recent work on religion and its role in the public sphere by comparing it to Kant’s phi-losophy of religion on the one hand and that of Kierkegaard on the other. It is argued that although Habermas is in many ways a Kantian, he diverges from Kant when it comes to religion, by taking a position which comes closer to the Kierkegaardian view that religiousness belongs to private faith rather than philosophy. This has (...) implications not just for the conception of religion but also for the very roles of communication, validity, rationality, and philosophy. (shrink)

Kierkegaard differs from his contemporaries Schopenhauer and Nietzsche by emphasizing the value of hope and its importance for human agency and selfhood (practical identity). In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard argues that despair involves a loss of hope and courage that is extremely common. Moreover, despair involves being double-minded by having an incoherent practical identity (although it need not be recognized as such if the agent mistakes his identity). A coherent practical identity, by contrast, requires wholehearted commitment towards ideals and (...) the hope that our ideals are realizable. Kierkegaard develops an existential account of hope that emphasizes the interrelation between hope and despair (hopelessness), seeing both as crucial for human agency and selfhood. More specifically, Kierkegaard defends the strong view that we should always hope for the good, no matter how bad the situation might be. Put differently, Kierkegaard sees hope against hope as necessary for human agency and selfhood. His emphasis lies not so much on a description of what hope is as an analysis of what justified hope is. More specifically, Kierkegaard argues that justified hope is interrelated with charity and religious faith, and has the highest good (eternal bliss) as its proper object. As such, it belongs not only to a Judeo-Christian tradition that focuses on the Pauline triad of faith, hope, and charity but it also belongs to a philosophical tradition from Augustine and Kant that views the highest good (the summum bonum), a synthesis of virtue and happiness, as the ultimate object of hope. However, Kierkegaard goes beyond his forerunner by developing a via negativa approach to hope that starts with hopelessness and despair before it proceeds to hope. Indeed, Kierkegaard argues that proper hope, hope against hope, both presupposes and overcomes despair at every instant. (shrink)

Kant’s critical philosophy represents a rudimentary existentialism, or a proto-existentialism, in the following respects: He emphasizes human finitude, limits our knowledge, and argues that human consciousness is characterized by mineness (Jemeinigkeit). He introduces the influential concept of autonomy, something that lead to controversies about constructivism and anti-realism in meta-ethics and anticipated problems concerning decisionism in Existentialism. Kant makes human freedom the central philosophical issue, arguing (in the incorporation thesis) that freedom is inescapable for human agents. He even holds that awareness (...) of freedom leads to anxiety (as opposed to fear), and that anxiety precedes the fall into evil. In the doctrine of radical evil, he argues that human agents are always already suffering from self-deception because of this fall. In order to overcome self-deception and evil, Kant proscribes a radical self-choice in which the agent takes over himself and society by thinking independently and consistently. However, this is not only a moral issue for Kant but also something that concerns religious faith and hope, since Kant argues that we need religion to overcome not only moral evil but also despair. Although he criticizes traditional natural theology, Kant develops a practical (moral) interpretation of religion that anticipates religious Existentialism. In this context, he developed an influential critique of philosophical theodicies and a notion of the hiddenness of God that emphasizes the importance and inscrutability of evil. By doing this, and by introducing philosophy of religion and philosophical anthropology as new disciplines, Kant prepared the ground for Existentialism. (shrink)

This chapter relates Kierkegaard’s views on anthropology and selfhood to Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical anthropology. It focuses on Kierkegaard’s contribution to anthropology, and discusses the relation between philosophical and theological anthropology in Kierkegaard. The chapter gives a synopsis of these issues by focusing on The Sickness unto Death, although important elements of this work are anticipated by Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. After an historical introduction and brief remarks on Kierkegaard’s method, the chapter moves to human (...) nature, selfhood, and despair in The Sickness unto Death. We will see that human nature is interpreted as a synthesis of opposites, whereas selfhood requires self-consciousness and higher-order volition. Nevertheless, The Sickness unto Death approaches selfhood and anthropology negatively by focusing on despair, a deficient form of agency that involves double-mindedness. Kierkegaard argues that despair can only be overcome by wholeheartedness and religious faith. Whereas Part I of The Sickness unto Death provides a philosophical anthropology that distinguishes between inauthentic (non-conscious) and authentic (conscious) despair, Part II develops a theological anthropology that focuses on faith and despair before God. Part I analyses and criticizes various forms of despair on their own terms, whereas Part II identifies despair with sin on the presupposition of divine revelation. Overall, The Sickness unto Death provides a systematic analysis of despair that has been influential in continental philosophy and theology. It is a fascinating contribution to anthropology and theories of selfhood because of its typology and negativistic phenomenology. On the one hand, the analysis of non-conscious despair provides an intriguing account of self-deception, facticity, and freedom. On the other, the analysis of demonic despair—which does evil because it is evil—appears to challenge the widespread idea that all intentional action is prompted by something that appears good). (shrink)

This chapter sketches a reconstruction of the concept of hidden inwardness that argues that the concept refers to ethico-religious characters that are expressed in deeds and words, rather than a private inner world. By relying on the distinction between morality and legality, I argue that “hidden inwardness” is not compatible with all kinds of behavior and that it is better described negatively than positively. The concept of hidden inwardness need therefore not be as problematic as is often assumed, since it (...) mainly involves the idea that we do not know hearts and minds. Still, Kierkegaard’s later works use “hidden inwardness” in a different manner than the earlier pseudonymous writings. However, I argue that this change in use of the term involves more a change of emphasis, which prevents misuses of “hidden inwardness,” than any significant change of theoretical position. Finally, I show that “hidden inwardness” sheds light on the controversial theses “Subjectivity is truth” and “Subjectivity is untruth” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. (shrink)

Philosophers who study conspiracy theories have increasingly addressed the questions of where conspiracy theories come from, what such theories do, and what to do about them. This essay serves as a commentary on the answers to these questions offered by contributors to this special issue.

This article deals with how moral freedom relates to historicity and contingency by comparing Kierkegaard's theory of the anthropological synthesis to Kant's concept of moral character. The comparison indicates that there are more Kantian elements in Kierkegaard's anthropology than shown by earlier scholarship. More specifically, both Kant and Kierkegaard see a true change in the way one lives as involving not only a revolution in the way one thinks, but also that one takes over—and tries to reform—both oneself and human (...) society. Also, Kierkegaard relies on the ideality of ethics and the doctrines of moral rigorism and radical evil. However, Kierkegaard can be seen as trying to find amore systematic role for historicity and contingency than Kant by developing the concept of facticity and by analyzing the so-called “despair of possibility.”. (shrink)

The epistemic virtues and vices are typically defined in terms of effects or motivations related to the epistemic states of their possessors. However, philosophers have recently begun to consider _other-regarding_ epistemic virtues, traits oriented toward the epistemic flourishing of others. In a similar vein, this paper discusses _outward-facing_ epistemic vices, properties oriented toward the epistemic languishing of others. I argue for the existence of both reliabilist and responsibilist outward-facing vices, and illustrate how such vices negatively bear on the epistemic prospects (...) of others. I pay special attention to how outward-facing epistemic vices may manifest in online activities that promote the epistemic languishing of others by negatively influencing the online epistemic environment. (shrink)

While it is commonly held that natural evil and suffering undermine religious belief, Kant and Kierkegaard both argue that religion and ethics presuppose discontentment, hardship, and uncertainty. Both argue that moral purity requiresthat this world be imperfect both in the sense of having restricted knowledgeand in the sense that virtue does not lead to happiness. Thus, both thinkersmake constitutive assumptions about the moral structure of the world on prac-tical grounds. But whereas Kant insists that there must be some connection inthis (...) world between morality and happiness, Kierkegaard tends to deny this, portraying this world either as amoral (in 1843–46) or as evil (in 1850–55). (shrink)

Some people insist that they are dead. Rather than starting with the usual assumption that delusions are ‘false beliefs about external reality’ I want to consider how interpreting their claim as a report of a certain kind of anomalous experience assists us in understanding why they are certain, why their claim is immune from evidence to the contrary, and why they do not act in ways we would expect were they to believe their claim to be true of the world. (...) While this helps us understand cases where people do not act on their delusions, more must be said about the people who do act on their delusions. I shall attempt to describe a process where an intense anomalous experience leads to a context-specific narrowing of attention. The ultimate result of this is that the appearance / reality distinction becomes lost in the context of the anomalous experience. The sense of conviction that would be appropriately associated with a report of experience thus becomes inappropriately associated with a claim about external reality. While there have been efforts to provide cognitive therapy for delusional subjects such therapy seems to be based on the notion that confronting them with their contradictions will assist in weakening their sense of certainty about the delusional utterance. I consider whether more progress could be made via empathetic validation of the sense of certainty which is appropriate when associated with the person’s anomalous experience. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship of mourning and the gift in the work of Jacques Derrida. I argue that mourning is not a Derridean gift, but mourning does open us to the gift. Reading the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Kierkegaard on friendship and love to the dead in the wake of Derrida’s Politics of Friendship makes this relation among mourning and the gift apparent for he presents mourning as the opening to a democracy to-come whose logic is the gift. (...) Through these accounts, I maintain that in preparing us for the gift, mourning the dead other can help us to relate better with the living other in ethical, political, and ontological terms. (shrink)

Commentary in reply to an article by Jeff McMahan and Julian Savulescu.

Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that it is morally worse for a human being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower animal (such as a dog or a cow) to suffer a harm that is equally severe (ceteris paribus). In this paper, I argue that this view receives rather less support from our intuitions than one might at first suppose. According to Kagan, moreover, an individual’s moral status depends partly upon her ‘modal capacities.’ In this (...) paper, I argue that the most natural strategy for justifying Kagan’s theory faces some important challenges. More generally, I argue that philosophers who wish to defend the view that human beings have a higher moral status than that of the lower animals face a dilemma. Either their theory of moral status will imply (unacceptably) that some severely cognitively impaired human beings have a significantly lower moral status than that of typical human beings, or these philosophers will be forced to ground moral status in a set of properties so far removed from a subject’s actual capacities that it will become difficult to see why these kinds of properties should have such moral importance. (shrink)

One of the disadvantages of redistributive taxation is that it reduces people’s financial incentives to increase national wealth and benefit others by engaging in productive activities. It is natural to suppose that the severity of this disadvantage will be proportional to the socially prevailing level of human selfishness. Thus, several advocates of redistribution (inter alia G. A. Cohen; Ha-Joon Chang) have argued that this disadvantage of redistribution need not be as severe as critics often suggest, because human beings need not (...) be so selfish. My aim in this paper is to argue that even in a society entirely composed of unselfish and impartially beneficent individuals, redistributive taxation would still discourage activities which contribute to national wealth, because differing individuals have different views about what counts as benefitting themselves and others. I also relate my discussion to G. A. Cohen’s influential ‘camping trip’ argument for socialism (from Why Not Socialism?). (shrink)

This paper defends the claim that mere temporal proximity always and without exception strengthens certain moral duties, including the duty to save – call this view Robust Temporalism. Although almost all other moral philosophers dismiss Robust Temporalism out of hand, I argue that it is prima facie intuitively plausible, and that it is analogous to a view about special obligations that many philosophers already accept. I also defend Robust Temporalism against several common objections, and I highlight its relevance to a (...) number of practical policy debates, including longtermism. My conclusion is that Robust Temporalism is a moral live option, that deserves to be taken much more seriously in the future. (shrink)

Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive psychology experiments demonstrate that social influences on memory disrupt and inhibit individual recall. However, most research in cognitive psychology has focused on groups of strangers recalling relatively meaningless stimuli. In the current study, we examined social influences on memory in groups with a shared history, who were recalling a range of stimuli, from word lists to personal, (...) shared memories. We focused in detail on the products and processes of remembering during in-depth interviews with 12 older married couples. These interviews consisted of three recall tasks: (1) word list recall; (2) personal list recall, where stimuli were relevant to the couples’ shared past; and (3) an open-ended autobiographical interview. We conducted these tasks individually and then collaboratively two weeks later. Across each of the tasks, although some couples demonstrated collaborative inhibition, others demonstrated collaborative facilitation. We identified a number of factors that predicted collaborative success, in particular, group-level strategy use. Our results show that collaboration may help or hinder memory, and certain interactions are more likely to produce collaborative benefits. (shrink)